China's Domestic and Regional Challenges

As part of my studies and preparations for China, I looked deeply into China’s domestic and regional challenges to better understand what kinds of issues inform and affect Chinese Political thought. The following is an analysis of these domestic challenges. While studying these challenges, I learned a lot about the different regions of China and the many different ethnic groups in China. While in Shanghai, I met many students from the various areas if China and surrounding China such as Mongolia and the Xinjiang Uygur autonomous regions. Meeting these students while having this background knowledge really helped me to connect and understand the Chinese people and culture in a deeper and more meaningful way. I believe that, as an American, understanding these topics can be incredibly helpful when traveling to China because it focuses on China’s domestic culture from an American perspective, both as a traveler and as a political scientist.

As China continues to grow and develop at an unprecedented rate, the relationship between the United States and China has become strategically more important and more tenuous—many Americans feel threatened by China’s rise to power. And 45% of Chinese people believe the United States to be a “major threat” to Chinese success and development—much more so than economic instability or climate change (1). The mutual uncertainty and fear expressed by both the United States and China is not surprising. The United States and China compete constantly to be the world’s largest economy, and compete for control in many important strategic regions, such as the South China Sea. These competing interests may seem to lead inevitably towards war and conflict, however, Former Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs, Thomas J. Christensen, predicted that both countries will strive to avoid conflict, realizing the catastrophic consequences warfare would cause in both countries domestically and the consequences it would pose to the global economy. In fact, although many Americans fear Chinese economic growth, according to Christensen, “an economic collapse would arguably pose a much greater risk to the United States than Chinese economic dominance" (2). Therefore, Christensen sees the “China Challenge” not as avoiding military conflict or limiting its economic growth but rather encouraging China to pull their weight in the international community. The United States, however, will be unable to convince and encourage China to play a larger role in the international community without first understanding the pressures China and the CCP faces internally. The lasting disagreement between the United States demonstrates how domestic interests influence Chinese actions and how the United States much change its strategy to consider domestic and regional concerns to persuade China to take a more active role in global and regional leadership. 

When Xi Jinping took office in 2012, he preached to the Communist Party of China about the “Chinese dream”, or China’s desire to return to what they view as their historic place as a global leader. One of the biggest focuses on obtaining this Chinese dream is to maintain party legitimacy and domestic stability. The CCP is necessarily focused inward, “lacking the procedural legitimacy of democratically elected officials while simultaneously facing the collapse of communist ideology, the CCP has no choice but to fall back on using China’s history, culture, and patriotism as its “societal glue” (3). Therefore, although China is not democratic, public opinion and support is important in maintaining legitimacy. Furthermore, communism relies on strong nationalism and a series of unifying narratives that stress the importance of communism as synonymous with the Chinese identity. China is not the first country where distorting the historical narrative became crucial to legitimacy. In Communism and Cultural Heritage by Soviet Èleazar Aleksandrovič Baller, the author discussed the importance of creating a cultural heritage and demonstrates how, because the country is state-run, the history must be also created by the state as opposed to forming organically. He mentioned the creation of monuments and museums to promote state pride and therefore the party’s legitimacy. One way Xi Jinping’s framing of the “Chinese Dream” has come to play is in China’s relationship with North Korea. Today, the United States must understand and consider the Chinese narrative about North Korea if the United States aims to create meaningful change in Chinese policy. 

The Chinese narrative about the Korean War is entrenched in anti-American sentiment and describes China as the protector of North Korea from America’s overreaching quasi-imperialism. At the 60th Korean War Anniversary Symposium, Xi Jinping made a highly-recognized speech, largely due to how the speech illuminates the CCP’s narrative about the Korean War. For example, Xi Jinping starts off the speech by declaring that “sixty years ago, the imperialist invaders imposed this war on the Chinese people,” which is the very first reference to the United States. The party’s narrative is also one that preaches the power of the underdog, however, only when the party is that underdog. Xi Jinping described the differences in resources and weaponry between the American/South Korean alliance and that of the Chinese as “extremely disparate”. However, he said, “despite the extreme inequities and difficult conditions, the Chinese People’s Volunteer army . . . won one glorious victory after another.” Therefore, if this speech accurately depicts the views of the people of China, then further United States intervention in North Korea does not appear in the interest of human rights or global peace, but instead as another overreach of the United States. Therefore, even when dealing with the North Korea problem is in China’s strategic interests they will be reluctant to act because of the damage to the party’s image and its legitimacy. Thus, the United States must work inside this narrative if they aim to increase China’s involvement in North Korea. 

Additionally, China has been very careful to control the news and media about North Korea that is consumed by the Chinese people. Xi Jinping ended his speech by stating that, “this victory greatly improved our country’s status in the world, inspired the oppressed nations to strive for independence and liberation, and advanced world peace and human progress.” To Americans, the idea that fighting for North Korea, a nation known for its massive human rights violation and nuclear threats, was advancing world peace and human progress is laughable. However, to the Chinese whose state-run media has hidden these atrocities, this view is not unrealistic or uncommon. For example, state-run media has repeatedly suggested that China will support North Korea or stay neutral if North Korea and the United States come into armed conflict. The Global Times, a prominent state-run newspaper said, "China should also make clear that if North Korea launches missiles that threaten U.S. soil first and the U.S. retaliates, China will stay neutral.” Although the Global Times does not represent party policy, it does demonstrate what the public is being told about North Korea. However, the Chinese relationship with North Korea isn’t perfect. The Chinese are becoming increasingly upset and incensed with North Korea’s actions. Alison Evans, deputy head of Asia-Pacific country risk at IHS Markit, describes North Korea as a “belligerent little brother.” She also described how North Korea’s actions were becoming increasingly hard to justify and said, By continuing its aggressive actions towards the United States, “North Korea has caused China to lose face and it just shows that North Korea is not behaving in a way that keeps its allies in mind.” However, this face-saving not only affects Chinese allies and its global image but also becomes harder to justify and hide from its own people. Therefore, changing China’s mind on North Korea is possible, if the United States actively tries to understand China’s internal narrative and situation. 

Furthermore, the CCP and many Chinese citizens still hold a quasi-Cold War view of North Korea, demonstrating the importance that a relationship with North Korea plays in the regional power balance throughout Asia and specifically the South China Sea. In an article written by Chu Shulong sponsored by the National Committee on American foreign policy, Shulong wrote that, “in regional geopolitical and strategic views, most Chinese still see the U.S., Japan, and South Korea (ROK) as the ‘other bloc,’ and Russia, China, and the DPRK as the loosely different group in Northeast Asia; and the Chinese do not want to change this regional structure.” This view which may seem antiquated to contemporary Americans rests largely on Xi Jinping’s “China dream” that was discussed earlier. This “dream” contains the idea that China should and will return to its rightful place as a leader in the world and especially in Asia. Chinese culture is largely based on tradition and history. For example, this belief is evident in China’s debates with many other Asian countries over territorial disputes. China refers to its historical holdings from the 1930s that is often referred to as the nine-dash line. However, many countries, such as “The Philippines and Vietnam also do not believe that China’s claims on the South China Sea based on historical reasons are more valid than their understanding of international law.” China sees itself as coming out of a century of humiliation and aims to reclaim its place as the dominant power in the region. Therefore, North Korea is seen not only as an ally but also as an important strategic concern when establishing Chinese dominance and pushing against what these as overreaching American influence. Therefore, the United States must understand regional politics in the South China Sea and its regional interests to foster a solution to the continuing North Korean problem. 

To change Chinese policy the United States has many options and many details it should consider. First, the United States could wait until North Korea’s actions become so egregious, that the CCP can no longer ignore them and hide their actions from the Chinese citizens. This stance, however, runs a large risk because it assumes that the action taken by North Korea is large enough to garner action by China but small enough that it doesn’t necessitate retaliation from the United States. The results of conflict in the Korean peninsula has the potential to be very disastrous. World Affairs experts Robert D. Kaplan and Abraham M. Denmark predicted that, “a North Korean collapse—a possibility but not a certainty—could drag China, South Korea, Japan, and possibly the United States into conflict.” This result is likely because China fears having the democratic South Korea as its border, a country it seems as synonymous with the United States and its influence, and much prefers communist North Korea as a buffer state. Furthermore, China fears the influx of refugees, but, more likely, fears the information they may bring to the Chinese people about the atrocities of the North Korean regime and problematic details about China’s involvement in the Korean War. Therefore, if North Korea falls, China is likely to become involved militarily and may oppose the unification of a democratic South Korea. Additionally, “Former defense officials and experts say any new military conflict with North Korea would likely escalate quickly to the use of nuclear weapons, bringing catastrophic casualties not seen since World War Two and an untold economic impact worldwide” which provides further evidence against allowing the situation in North Korea to escalate. On the other side, however, the United States could give up its interests in spreading its influence and use its allies to cooperate with China in controlling North Korea. This tactic would involve the United States to appear more deferential to China and its sphere of influence, but would likely lead to China taking more of an active role in addressing the North Korean problem. However, the United States has many interests in the South China Sea outside of North Korea and this may affect those prospects. Therefore, the United States government must weigh the importance of its many interests. Although the North Korean problem is highly complex and no action represents a perfect solution, moving forward the United States must work to understand China’s domestic policies, challenges, and narrative if it endeavors to encourage China to take a more active role and responsibility in the global world. 

As the two largest economies, the United States and China naturally have strategic differences and these interests will often clash, however, this divergence does not mean that China and the United States must be at conflict with each other. In the past, the United States has not treated China for what it is—a communist-run country with a state-run capitalist economy. In order to move forward the United States must understand how, in China’s unique system, domestic interests play a crucially important role in maintaining party legitimacy, the number one goal for the CCP and President Xi Jinping. As shown in the situation in North Korea, if the United States wants China to take a more dominant role in global leadership, they must consider and utilize the challenges China faces at home if they want to make strategic changes abroad. 

Beyond regional stability, China also faces challenges within its own borders—mostly in the Tibet and Xinjiang Autonomous Regions.  Around 92% of the population of China is considered Han Chinese while only 8-9% of the population belongs to one of 56 Chinese ethnic minorities.  However, small this percentage may seem, the different ethnic groups are not distributed evenly throughout China.  For example, the Uyghur ethnic group accounts for only .023% of the population in China’s capital city, Beijing, while they account for 46% of the population in Xinjiang.  This lack of diversity throughout China is the symptom of continual and systemic segregation that undermines the CCP and creates instability, especially throughout the Western most regions.  Since the late 2000s, China has been addressing issues of diversity and how to create more stability throughout the minority regions.  According to a study by Mark Elliott, “since 2008, as the situation in many of the country’s ethnically distinct frontier regions—notably Tibet, Xinjiang and Mongolia—has deteriorated, a fact widely acknowledged even within China,” there has been surprisingly open conversation about how to revise China’s policies towards ethnic minorities, a step that could be important to China in fostering stability. 

Since the creation of the CCP, China has relied on ethnoterritorial federalism, a system first used by the Soviet Union.  Both countries, at the end of their communist revolutions, had to face the challenge of uniting inherited “vast territories and multi-ethnic populations from the preceding empires.” In the system they created, “nationality groups were granted their own administrative territories and subnational governments”, which is evident in Tibet and Xinjiang’s existence as “autonomous regions.” The design was created to allow ethnic groups to have some independence but still to identify with the communist government as a way to prevent and decrease ethnic conflict when ruling over such large territories. Of course, the Soviet Union’s use of this technique ended when it collapsed in 1991. However, China still uses an ethnoterritorial arrangement.  China has five autonomous regions—Tibet, Inner Mongolia, Xinjiang Uyghur, Ningxia Hui, Guangxi Zhuang.  Often, these regions have more lenient rules—they usually have a chairman from their dominant ethnicity, have more leniency to educate their children, and less restrictive internet and surveillance guidelines. However, this technique has a dangerous centrifugal tendency, as demonstrated by the collapse of the Soviet Union.  For example, distinguishing regions by ethnicity can lead to the hardening of ethnic lines and mass migrations which further separate populations.  In a case study by Lovise Aalen and Magnus Hatlebakk about ethnofederalism in Nepal, they discussed how creating ethnic regions causes “ethnic political mobilization” that can cause minority groups to become more active and more hostile to others.  This phenomenon is undoubtedly true in China where regions are continually becoming more separated and making more demands for independence from the Chinese government. In Nepal, the central government failed to convince the ethnic regions to engage and adopt the central message of the country, leading to violence and instability.  This volatile atmosphere is problematic for the CCP, as shown by the continual conversation about China’s ethnic policy.  However, China’s ethnoterritorial system is very closely tied to their communist origins and many fear that change could undermine the party.

One of the most notable scholars in this area is Ma Rong of Peking University.  His proposal to help fix the ethnic conflicts in China would provide for a more stable social outcome, however, it does require moving to a system of cultural assimilation more similar to the United States and represents a move away from the “Soviet model”.  Ma, a Hui Chinese, proposes removing ethnic distinctions and moving towards a system where all the groups are consolidated under the idea of “The Chinese People” or “Zhonghua minzu”.  Ma, like many Chinese, believes that, “national independence movements are the greatest threat that China faces in the 21^st century”, thus he wants to “create a community of citizens bound together in a shared political enterprise and to short-circuit the divisive forces behind ethnic interest groups”.  In many ways, Ma’s proposal could help the CCP—it would create more stability in the frontier regions of China so that the party can focus their resources on other areas, however, his plan also has many potential problems. First, many in the party believe Ma relies too closely on the United States’ model.  Many have critiqued Ma for “praising the norms of Western liberal pluralism” and fear that his plan could lead the Chinese people closer to democratization—the party’s biggest fear.  Additionally, among the people, there still exists conflict between the ethnic groups that occasionally lead to violence.  The party fears that adopting such a drastic change could insight more violence and instability in the short-run. 

Understanding that Chinese ethnic tensions are a main focus of the Chinese government and that the party has not made its continuing policies clear, the United States has an opportunity to shape China’s future.  In the long run, it would be better for the United States to recommend Ma’s plan, rather than the continuation of the Soviet structure.  Although Ma’s plan would likely lead China to put more of its resources and focuses into controlling the South China Sea and the surrounding regions, it would likely lead China to be more cooperative with the United States and more in line with American values.  On the other hand, the Soviet structure will very likely lead to destabilization of the Western half of China, which could cause war and entangle other Asian countries in alliances and undoubtedly involve the United States.  Therefore, the United States should support a more open and integrative ethnic policy in China.  However, the United States must recognize that, in order to make Ma’s plan effective, they cannot appear to undermine the CCP.  Therefore, the United States should support desegregation subtly and allow China to come to its conclusion naturally, which will not only create a more stable China but a China that is more likely to cooperate with the United States in the international theater. 

China’s domestic problems are compounded by the involvement and interests of surrounding areas, most notably in the autonomous region of Tibet.  Most Tibetans practice Lamaism, a variant of Buddhism that centers around the popular figure of the Dalai Lama.  The Dalai Lama fought for Tibetan independence and was banished to India in 1959, however, many Tibetans still have allegiance to the Dalai Lama rather than the Chinese government, which is very problematic for the CCP who relies heavily on party loyalty.  “In 1959, a revolt in Tibet against Chinese rule sparked the largest internal threat to the People’s Republic of China’s territorial integrity” according to a study on instability in the Chinese regime.  This may appear to be a purely internal problem faced by the Chinese government, however, during the revolt, many other countries, including Burma, Nepal, and India became heavily involved.  After the revolt, China was pressured to make many concessions in the region. The country conceded much of the land it claimed during the Sino-Indian border dispute and also relented to anti-communists speech made by the Dalai Lama. Also, although China initially suppressed Tibet harshly, the resulting system was much more lenient to Tibetan self-government, representation, and worship. Therefore, instability within China not only poses a risk to the CCP internally but also would lead to regional conflict.  This major focus of the CCP demonstrates why domestic politics are at the forefront of the country’s mind and why the United States must understand China’s domestic motivations in order to create more cooperation globally.

The CCP’s challenges in Tibet have also been one of the main reasons China and the United States have clashed over human rights issues.  In a case study of the Lhasa riot of 2008, Beijing made its position clear—“it was neither a sovereignty nor human rights problem, and China should have the monopoly of rights in handling its internal affairs without foreign intervention.” However, the United States and its democratic allies saw Beijing’s use of “troops and armed police to quell the riots” as problematic to the international order and their duties to human rights.  This disagreement led to an escalation of conflict when President Obama chose to meet with the Dali Lama, contrary to Beijing’s wishes.  However, at the same time, Obama stressed, “the US policy that Tibet is a part of the People’s Republic of China and the United States does not support independence for Tibet.” Although Obama’s dedication to human rights is admirable, and the majority of Americans support his actions and Tibet, the United States should be more clear in its intentions when dealing with the CCP.  Instead, the United States must work with China to improve their human rights record, rather than against the country.

The CCP’s main interest will always be in the integrity and survival of the party. All other concerns, such as human rights and international relations will always come second in China’s priorities.  China faces many challenges in the region, such as with North Korea and India, and many challenges domestically, such as with its ethnic diversity and autonomous regions.  If the United States aims to take Christenson’s recommendation—to encourage China to pull their weight internationally—they must understand China’s domestic concerns.  If the United States can work with China’s domestic and regionally priorities, there is much greater room for cooperation between the two countries, leading to a better relationship and improved international community.  

[1] AFP In Beijing, "Chinese people see US as top threat to their country, poll shows," The Guardian, October 05, 2016, accessed February 27, 2018, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/oct/05/china-us-power-top-threat-survey.

[2] Thomas J. Christensen, The China Challenge, First ed. (New York, NY: W.H. Norton & Company, 2015), 3.

[3] Wang, Zheng. "The Chinese Dream: Concept and Context." Journal Of Chinese Political Science 19, no. 1 (March 2014): 1-13. Academic Search Complete, EBSCOhost (accessed February 27, 2018), 6.

[4] "Xi Jinping's Speech at the 60th Korean War Anniversary Symposium." Chinascope no. 49 (January 2011): 18-19. Academic Search Complete, EBSCOhost (accessed March 4, 2018), 18.

[5] Ibid.

[6] Ibid.

[7] "Xi Jinping's Speech at the 60th Korean War Anniversary Symposium." Chinascope no. 49 (January 2011): 18-19. Academic Search Complete, EBSCOhost (accessed March 4, 2018), 19.

[8] Blanchard, Ben, and James Oliphant. "Chinese State Media Says China Should be Neutral if North Korea Attacks the U.S." Time.Com (August 11, 2017): 20. Academic Search Complete, EBSCOhost (accessed March 4, 2018).

[9] Holly Ellyatt, "Stability and strategy: Why is China so easy on North Korea?" CNBC, December 06, 2017, , accessed March 04, 2018, https://www.cnbc.com/2017/12/01/china-easy-reaction-to-north-korea.html.

[10] Ibid.

[11] Shulong, Chu. 2015. "China's Perception and Policy about North Korea." American Foreign Policy Interests 37, no. 5/6: 273-278. Academic Search Complete, EBSCOhost (accessed March 4, 2018), 273.

[12] Wang, Zheng. "The Chinese Dream: Concept and Context." Journal Of Chinese Political Science 19, no. 1 (March 2014): 1-13. Academic Search Complete, EBSCOhost (accessed February 27, 2018), 9.

[13] If North Korea Falls." Wilson Quarterly 35, no. 3 (Summer2011 2011): 55-56. Academic Search Complete, EBSCOhost (accessed March 4, 2018).

[14] Holly Ellyatt, "Stability and strategy: Why is China so easy on North Korea?" CNBC, December 06, 2017, , accessed March 04, 2018, https://www.cnbc.com/2017/12/01/china-easy-reaction-to-north-korea.html.

[15] "Chinese Ethnic Groups." Chinese Ethnic Groups: Han People and 55 Ethnic Minorities. Accessed April 22, 2018. https://www.travelchinaguide.com/intro/nationality/.

[16] Elliott, Mark. "The Case of the Missing Indigene: Debate Over a "Second-Generation" Ethnic Policy." China Journal no. 73 (January 2015): 186-213. Academic Search Complete, EBSCOhost (accessed April 22, 2018).

[17] Matsuzato, Kimitaka. 2017. "The Rise and Fall of Ethnoterritorial Federalism: A Comparison of the Soviet Union (Russia), China, and India." Europe-Asia Studies 69, no. 7: 1047-1069. Academic Search Complete, EBSCOhost (accessed April 22, 2018).

[18] Matsuzato, Kimitaka. 2017. "The Rise and Fall of Ethnoterritorial Federalism: A Comparison of the Soviet Union (Russia), China, and India." Europe-Asia Studies 69, no. 7: 1047-1069. Academic Search Complete, EBSCOhost (accessed April 22, 2018).

[19] Elliott, Mark. "The Case of the Missing Indigene: Debate Over a "Second-Generation" Ethnic Policy." China Journal no. 73 (January 2015): 186-213. Academic Search Complete, EBSCOhost (accessed April 22, 2018).

[20] Fravel, M. Taylor. 2005. "Regime Insecurity and International Cooperation: Explaining China's Compromises in Territorial Disputes." International Security 30, no. 2: 46-83. Academic Search Complete, EBSCOhost (accessed April 22, 2018).

[21] Cao, Yongrong, and Jian Xu. 2015. "The Tibet Problem in the Milieu of a Rising China: findings from a survey on Americans' attitudes toward China." Journal Of Contemporary China 24, no. 92: 240-259. Academic Search Complete, EBSCOhost (accessed April 22, 2018).

Sidney Cobb, of Frankfort, Ky., is a member of the McConnell Scholar Class of 2019. She studies political science and history at the University of Louisville.