Skip to main content

China and The Urban

Landon Lauder
Class of 2017
China’s cities were and remain quite large. So what exactly is “urban” in China? Professor Richard Dilworth from Drexel University seemed to have a hint at an answer. 

According to Dr. Dilworth, much of China’s urban growth occurred in the past two decades and rose somewhere between 10 to 20 percent. This amount of growth landed China at 260 people per square mile, whereas in the United States, excluding Alaska, we are at a dwarfed 70 people per square mile.

China’s causes of urbanization were, as Dr. Dilworth seemed to indicate, hard to pinpoint. This is due to the Hukou system implemented by the government to entice citizens to move towards urban centers as China increasingly turned towards manufacturing. Additionally, once China began to open up to foreign private investment, there were additional incentives and allure ascribed to China’s urban areas. These intertwined factors of urbanization all told the story of internal migration, much like what the United States experienced in the pre and post WWII era.

Yet, here is where the similarities seem to end between the United States and China. This is because the urban government structure in China is vastly different than the United States. This should come at no surprise due to the centralized nature of the Chinese government.

Dr. Dilworth adapted a flowchart from a dissertation that basically broke down the Chinese urban government structure down by each level. They are, in order from highest to lowest: the central (main) government, provincial government, city government, urban district government, street office, and then residence committees. While this may look oddly familiar to the United States system of urban governance, every step is controlled/managed by the central government. For example, while “residence committees” are still technically part of the Chinese central government, in the United States, we have neighborhood or homeowner’s associations that are all private.

This central structure has recently led China into quite a bit of a conundrum according to Dr. Dilworth. This mostly has to do with what are called “ghost cities.”

Ghost cities are cities that are planned and built in advance of a need or settlement and due to economic or social forces, remain unoccupied, yet built. China apparently has many of these failed investments. Not only that, but when cities are occupied, local governments are responsible for providing up to 80% of public services alone. When overinvestment in city planning is combined with the massive burden of public services, cities accrue quite a large amount of debt very quickly. And they have. According to Dr. Dilworth, most of China’s public debt is owned by city governments.

But, if city governments are owned by the central government, why the distinction in debt? Due to the massive size and obligations of cities, some of them are their own province when also accounting for their “suburban” areas as well. This is certainly the case for Beijing, Shanghai, and Tianjin (and possibly others). These cities/provinces are so large that they actually become viewed by the central government as lobbyists to the central government and be awarded some distinctions as such. Unfortunately, one of these distinctions is debt.


Returning to the question of “What is ‘urban’ in China,” we may not have a good answer for it just yet. It is arguably a recent movement in China, despite the presence of massive urban centers before “urbanization.” Additionally, we may be viewing it with too much of a Western urban bias, resulting is misaligned analysis. Nevertheless, as my primary academic interest is urban affairs, this is a topic I will increasingly turn towards once I arrive in China.

Landon Lauder is a junior McConnell Scholar at the University of Louisville. He studies political science, psychology, and social change.