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| Sam Whittaker |
By Sam Whittaker, Class of 2015
In the United States, the main foreign policy headline of the last month has been Russian aggression in the Ukraine and the Russian annexation of the Crimea by referendum, a vote that most United States citizens view as coerced and a mockery of true democracy. The headlines that have dominated the United States recently focus on the reaction of the United States Government and the reaction of western European democracies to the Ukrainian crisis. However, in light of our upcoming trip to China, I decided to look into stories relating to the Chinese Government’s reaction to Russian aggression in the Crimea.
China and Russia share a long border and have a long history as both allies and antagonists. While both nations were under Communist rule, the nations, who would have been thought to naturally be allied, split on policy and even engaged in an undeclared border war in the 1960s. This has been termed the Sino-Soviet Split by western analysts. However, since a 1989 visit by then Soviet Premier Mikhail Gorbachev, the two nations have essentially been allies. Today, China and Russia are important partners in international trade and share many strategic foreign policy goals. For example, they united in their support of the Assad regime in Syria and attempted to deter United Nations and western action against Syria.
However, the Crimean situation puts China in an awkward spot with their ally. Immediately in the wake of Russian action in the Crimea, Chinese foreign policy spokesmen were intentionally vague. The official statement released by Foreign Minister Liu Jieyi read, “There are reasons for today’s situation in Ukraine.” The foreign ministry spokesman left it ambiguously at that. The reason for this ambiguity is that the Chinese government stands to both gain and lose from Russian action in the Crimea.
To begin with reasons for potential Chinese support of Russia, Russian expansion could justify Chinese expansion into several Pacific territories they are known to have an eye on. If the Chinese Government supports Russia in this, they could perhaps expect support from Russia for their goals in turn. Likewise, if they oppose Russian expansion, their own expansionist goals could appear hypocritical. In addition, both nations oppose U.S. efforts to contain Sino-Russian foreign policy goals. It could benefit the Chinese to lend approval to Russia as long as its action in the Crimea undercuts U.S. influence and prestige. Finally, with Russia isolated from the west, Chinese trade with Russia will increase and important sectors such as Chinese energy stand to gain cheaper imports from Russia.
However, for all this, there is good reason to believe the Chinese will remain cautious. China did not support Russia in its occupation of Georgia. Moreover, the official policy of the Chinese is to only invade nations in self-defense, and they have a history of opposing nations attempted intimidation of states China recognizes as sovereign. The way that Russia went about the Crimean referendum likewise disturbs the Chinese. The Chinese Government does not support domestic secession efforts and does not condone the use of referendums and agitation to break away from a sovereign state. This is because China encompasses a wide variety of ethnic groups and has issues at home with domestic independence movements. In its attempt to suppress its own domestic movements, it does not want to be seen as lending support to one of these actions in the Ukraine.
For these conflicting reasons, it is expected that China will attempt to remain ambiguous in its position on the Ukrainian crisis.
Sam Whittaker, of Paducah, Ky., is a junior McConnell Scholar at the University of Louisville. He is studying history, political science, and economics.